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    *  The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  03-4846
PAUL F. SINCLAIR, JR.,
               Appellant
     v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
_______________
On appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Judge: The Honorable William J. Martini
District Court No. 01-cv-03711
_______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1
June 16, 2004
Before: ALITO, SMITH and WALLACE, Circuit Judges*
(Filed: July 26, 2004)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
The Commissioner of Social Security denied Paul F. Sinclair’s application for
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.  The District Court, exercising
2jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.  We have
appellate jurisdiction over Sinclair’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review is the same as that of the District Court, “namely to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.” Plummer v. Apfel,
186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Substantial evidence is “‘more
than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  
Sinclair, who was fifty-nine years old, claimed he was unable to perform any
substantial gainful activity because he suffered from hepatitis B and C.  The ALJ
disagreed and denied his claim for benefits, finding that he was able to perform his past
relevant work as a real estate broker.
Sinclair appealed, raising three issues.  First, Sinclair asserted that the ALJ erred
because he failed to comply with the mandate of Burnett v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 112, 119-
20 (3d Cir. 2000), to provide a reasoned explanation why Sinclair’s condition did not
satisfy the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of the Social Security
regulations.  See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1.  Second, Sinclair argued that
the ALJ erred because he failed to evaluate whether there were any limitations resulting
from Sinclair’s pain.  Sinclair’s third contention was that the ALJ failed to substantiate
his conclusion that Sinclair could perform medium level work.  None of Sinclair’s
3arguments have merit.  
Sinclair’s reliance on Burnett is misplaced because meaningful judicial review did
not require an exhaustive explanation as to whether Sinclair’s condition satisfied any of
the impairments listed in Appendix 1.  Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20.  As the District Judge
noted, there was only one listing for hepatitis and the record was devoid of any evidence
that Sinclair exhibited the criteria required for that listing.  
For Sinclair to take issue with the ALJ for allegedly failing to consider his pain is,
at the very least, cheeky.  Sinclair himself testified before the ALJ that the pain he alleged
in his application had been present initially for only several days and that he no longer
experienced pain.  Thus, the fact that the ALJ did not discuss this symptom at greater
length was a direct result of Sinclair’s own testimony.  In any event, the ALJ’s reasons for
rejecting Sinclair’s allegations of pain were sufficient and supported by substantial
evidence.
Finally, there is substantial evidence for the ALJ’s finding that Sinclair was able to
perform his past relevant work as a real estate broker which was sedentary in nature.  See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).  Sinclair did not challenge that finding here.  Indeed, Sinclair’s
own description of his duties as a real estate broker confirmed that the position was
sedentary, requiring sitting for eight hours a day.  Thus, there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s finding that Sinclair was able to perform the sedentary duties of his
past relevant work as a real estate broker and was not disabled.
In sum, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
determination that Sinclair was not disabled.  We will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
